ABSTRACT R adio-controlled improvised explosive devices (RCIEDs) have been a major weapon of choice by Iraqi insurgents since 2003. One effective way to prevent an RCIED attack is to use electronic jamming devices to interfere with the communication between the trigger and the bomb itself. Due to power constraints and other considerations, however, a jammer usually cannot jam all triggers simultaneously. In this paper, we develop game-theoretic models to study both active jamming and reactive jamming. For active jamming, we compute the optimal mixed strategy by linear programming; for reactive jamming, we use an iterative method. Finally, we numerically demonstrate our models and their applications.
INTRODUCTION
An improvised explosive device (IED) is a bomb manufactured and deployed in ways other than by conventional military actions. The IED has become an increasingly popular and effective weapon of destruction in modern warfare, and has been used extensively by Iraqi insurgents. These IED attacks result in casualties among both the coalition forces and civilians, and significantly undermine any reconstruction effort.
RCIEDs refer to an IED that is detonated by a radio signal. To detonate RCIEDs, the insurgents use commercially available products as wireless triggers such as walkietalkies, cellular phones, and garage door openers. One way to counter the RCIED attacks is to use an electronic jamming device that emits electro-magnetic waves to interfere with the communication between the wireless trigger and the bomb itself (Adamy 2000) . However, in some cases, it is impossible to jam the entire frequency spectrum because the jammer has limited power and, in some other cases, it is desirable to leave open some frequency bands for wireless communications. Consequently, the effectiveness of jamming is highly dependent on how the jamming power is allocated among frequency bands. The traditional approach to this power-allocation problem is to predict what RCIED triggers the insurgents will use, based on recent attack data.
The flaw of this approach is that, by the time a new jamming strategy is deployed, the insurgents may have already switched to a different set of RCIED triggers.
In this paper, we develop game-theoretic models between the insurgents and the coalition forces. The insurgents choose a wireless trigger to detonate an RCIED, while the coalition forces decide how to allocate jamming power among frequency bands. The insurgents want to maximize the expected damage caused by the RCIED, while the coalition forces want to minimize it. Because the game-theoretic models treat insurgents as an active player, the derived optimal jamming strategies do not rely on past attack data and are robust against adaptive insurgents.
We consider two types of jamming technology: active jamming and reactive jamming. With active jamming, the jammer emits electro-magnetic waves in preselected frequency bands, hoping that these selected bands include those used by the RCIEDs planted in the area. With reactive jamming, the jammer first scans the entire frequency spectrum to detect radio signals before allocating its jamming power. Both jamming models are formulated as two-person zerosum games. In the case of active jamming, we solve the problem by a linear program; in the case of reactive jamming, we use an iterative method to compute the optimal solution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the following section introduces the game-theoretic model for jamming RCIEDs; next, we discuss active jamming and reactive jamming, respectively; the subsequent section numerically demonstrates the models and their applications; and the last section concludes the paper.
MODEL
Consider a two-person zero-sum game played by Red (the insurgents) and Blue (the coalition forces). Red chooses a wireless triggering device (henceforth trigger) to detonate an RCIED, while Blue uses an electronic jammer to interfere with the detonation signal. Let T 5 f1; .; mg denote the set of all triggers available to Red, and B 5 f1; .; ng the set of all frequency bands used by these triggers. For i 2 T and j 2 B, let Most triggers use a single band, while some others can automatically scan several bands to find an open one, such as a quad-band cellular phone. An example with m 5 5 and n 5 8 is given in Table 1 , where triggers 1 and 2 each use a single band, while triggers 3-5 each use multiple bands. Also shown in Table 1 are two parameters associated with each trigger: damage and power. The parameter d i specifies the damage if an attack via RCIED i is successful, i 2 T. In some cases, it is possible to establish correlations between wireless triggers and the explosive material, in which case it may be desirable to assign different damage values to different triggers. Otherwise, one can assign d i 5 1 for all i 2 T, and the objective function becomes the probability of a successful RCIED attack. The other parameter w i refers to the power necessary to jam each frequency band of trigger i, i 2 T.
We consider a two-person zero-sum game with simultaneous moves. Red chooses one trigger from T 5 f1; .; mg to detonate the RCIED, so Red has m pure strategies. Blue's decision is how to allocate the total jamming power among the frequency bands, which depends on the jamming technology, namely active jamming and reactive jamming. We discuss these two types of jamming technology separately in the next two sections.
ACTIVE JAMMING
With active jamming, Blue has to decide at the onset how to allocate his jamming power. Denote the total jamming power by w, and a feasible strategy is an allocation of jamming power among n bands, as long as the total does not exceed w. Although this definition results in infinitely many pure strategies, we can trim them down by the following arguments.
First, each of Blue's pure strategy can be defined by the set of triggers it jams. If two pure strategies jam the same set of triggers, they should be regarded as the same pure strategy even if they have a different power allocation. For instance, in Table 1 , allocating power 0.7 to band 1 is equivalent to allocating power 0.8 to band 1, as both of them jam trigger 1, but nothing else. Because there are m triggers, this observation ensures that the total number of Blue's pure strategies is, at most, 2 m . We refer to each subset of T as a loadset, and there are 2 m loadsets. Second, for each of these 2 m loadsets, we can eliminate those that are infeasible; that is, those loadsets that require more than a total power w. Third, we can remove dominated loadsets. For instance, if it is feasible to jam triggers f1, 2, 4g all at once, then any loadset that is a subset of f1, 2, 4g is dominated. For a given total power, let L denote the set of all loadsets after applying these three steps.
Let l 5 L denote the number of Blue's pure strategies after applying these three steps. The value l depends on the total jamming power available w. When w is small, there are few pure strategies because most of loadsets are infeasible. When w is large, there are also few pure strategies because most of the loadsets are dominated. The largest possible value of l tends to occur when w is about half of the total power required to jam all m triggers. To write the two-person zero-sum game in the standard matrix form, note that the size of the matrix is m 3 l. Red chooses one of the m 
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triggers to use, while Blue chooses a loadset in L. When Red uses trigger i and Blue uses pure strategy k, i 2 T and k 2 L, the payoff to Red is v i;k 5 0; if Blue 0 s loadset k jams trigger i; d i ; otherwise:
(1)
Using the example in Table 1 , and supposing w ¼ 5, we can write the game in the standard matrix form in a 5 3 4 matrix, as shown in Table 2 .
A two-person zero-sum game in the standard matrix form can be solved by a linear program; for example, see Section 3.10 in Washburn (2003) . In Table 2 , Red's optimal mixed strategy is to choose each of the five triggers with probabilities The value of the game is 0.7442-the expected damage caused by an attempted RCIED attack.
REACTIVE JAMMING
With reactive jamming, the jammer first scans the entire frequency spectrum to detect radio signals, and then decides which loadset to use. The radio signal can originate from a legitimate use of wireless devices (normal use of cell phones), or it can be a signal to detonate an RCIED. The jammer, however, is not capable of determining the nature of a radio signal.
Because a reactive jammer detects radio signals, its effectiveness depends highly on the radio environment of the operational theater. For instance, in a desert there is usually little radio traffic, so most likely the jammer can jam all detected radio signals. In an urban area, however, the jammer is likely to detect a lot of radio signals, which cannot be blocked all at once by a feasible loadset. Consequently, the jammer needs to decide which loadset to use. Let a j denote the probability that frequency band j is used by a legitimate wireless device, j 2 B. If a j % 0, then a radio signal in band j is a good indication that Red deploys an RCIED that uses band j. If a j % 1, then a radio signal in band j does not render much information. Consequently, we expect the effectiveness of a reactive jammer to increase as a j decreases, j 2 B.
In the two-person zero-sum game with reactive jamming, Red wants to maximize the expected damage, while Blue wants to minimize it. Red's mixed strategy can be delineated by p 5 ðp 1 ; .; p m Þ, with p i denoting the probability of using trigger i, i 2 T. Blue's strategy, however, is much more complicated, as Blue needs to specify the loadset to use after first detecting the radio signals. In other words, a pure strategy for Blue needs to specify a loadset for each possible subset of B. Because there are 2 n subsets of B, the total number of Blue's pure strategies is l ð2 n Þ . For the problem in Table 1 Let 2 B denote the power set of B, which is the set of all subsets of B. An equivalent way to express Blue's mixed strategy is to write q k ðDÞ, for k 2 L, and for each D 2 2 B , with the 
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interpretation that when Blue detects radio signals in D, he uses loadset k with probability q k ðDÞ. With this expression, Blue needs to specify the probability distribution over l feasible loadsets for each D 2 2 B , so the number of decision variables is l 3 2 n , which is dramatically smaller than l ð2 n Þ . It is still possible to formulate a linear program to solve for Blue's optimal mixed strategy, because we can compute Blue's performance against each of Red's pure strategy. The same technique, however, is computationally infeasible to solve for Red's optimal mixed strategy, because the number of pure strategies for Blue is still l ð2 n Þ . In order to compute the optimal mixed strategy for both players, we use an iterative method adapted from that in Brown (1949) , which applies to a two-person zero-sum game in the standard matrix form. In the first iteration, each player arbitrarily chooses a pure strategy. In the nth iteration, n $ 2, each player uses the best pure strategy against his opponent's mixture of strategies used in the first n 2 1 iterations. Robinson (1951) proved that the mixture of strategies generated by this iterative method converges to the optimal mixed strategy for both players, as n tends to infinity.
To adopt this iterative method, we need to be able to compute the best pure strategy for either player against the opponent's mixed strategy. In the following subsection, we show how to determine Blue's best loadset against Red's mixed strategy. Next, we show how to determine Red's best trigger against Blue's mixed strategy. We then present an algorithm for this iterative method.
Blue's Best Loadset Against Red's Mixed Strategy
We first consider Blue's best strategy against Red's mixed strategy. Let p i denote the probability that Red uses trigger i, and let p 5 ðp 1 ; .; p m Þ denote Red's mixed strategy. With reactive jamming, Blue first identifies the set of bands where radio signals are present, and then decides which loadset to use.
Let D 2 2 B denote the set of bands where radio signals are detected. Recall that a j denotes the probability that there is legitimate use of frequency band j, j 2 B. Let
denote the set of bands that trigger i uses, i 2 T. Define 1 A as the indicator function, which takes value 1 if A is true or 0 otherwise. Using Bayes' formula (see, for example, Ross (2006)), we can derive
PðRed uses trigger i j radio signals detected in DÞ 5
If there exists a subset of D, denoted by C4D, such that a j 5 0 for j 2 C, then Blue knows the signals in bands C are due to an RCIED attack. Therefore, Red must be using a trigger that uses all bands in C. In this case, the probability it is trigger i, for i such that C4S i , is equal to
On the other hand, if a j . 0 for all j 2 D, then by dividing Q j2D a j in both the numerator and the denominator, Equation (3) becomes
where the equality follows because S i 4D implies that S i \ D 5 S i . In other words, we can first rule out those triggers whose corresponding bands are not a subset of D; if S i 4D for some i, then the probability it is the trigger being used is proportional to
Equation (3) allows Blue to compute the probability that trigger i is being used, based on detected radio signals D 2 2 B and Red's mixed strategy p 5 ðp 1 ; .; p m Þ. Blue can use these probabilities to compute the expected damage for each feasible loadset in L, and choose the one that minimizes the expected damage. In the case when two or more loadsets tie for optimum, Blue can choose any of them arbitrarily.
Generally speaking, Blue's optimal strategy is complicated. One special case, when it can be GAME-THEORETIC MODELS FOR JAMMING RADIO-CONTROLLED IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES determined explicitly, is given in the proposition below. Proof. According to Equation (4), the probability that trigger i is used, i 2 D, is PðRed uses trigger ijradio signals detected in DÞ 5
Because w i 5 1 for all i, Blue can jam up to wc b bands, or equivalently, wc b triggers, as each trigger uses one distinctive band. Consequently, the strategy prescribed in the proposition jams the triggers that have the highest expected damage, thereby minimizing the expected damage.
Red's Best Trigger Against Blue's Mixed Strategy
Blue's mixed strategy can be delineated by q k ðDÞ, such that loadset k is selected with probability q k ðDÞ, when radio signals are detected in D 2 2 B . To compute the expected damage by using trigger i for a given Blue's mixed strategy, we can first compute the conditional expected damage for a given set of background radio signals (radio signals due to legitimate uses of wireless devices, as opposed to signals due to an RCIED trigger). This technique can be found in, for example, Chapter 3 of Ross (2007) . Let R 2 2 B denote the set of bands with background radio signals, then the probability for R to occur is
When R occurs, Blue will detect radio signals in R [ S i , if Red uses trigger i, i 2 T. Consequently, the expected damage against Blue's mixed strategy when using trigger i is equal to
where v i;k is the damage if Red uses trigger i and Blue uses loadset k, as defined in Equation (1). Red can compare this expected damage for all triggers to determine which trigger yields the largest expected damage.
Compute the Optimal Mixed Strategy
The iterative method suggested by Brown (1949) applies to a two-person zero-sum game in the standard matrix form. Because the way we define Blue's strategy-namely q k ðDÞ, for k 2 L, and for each D 2 2 B -is not in the standard matrix form, we need to modify Brown's algorithm. In particular, in each iteration, Blue needs to decide which loadset to use for each D 2 2 B . Our algorithm goes as follows: Robinson (1951) proved that the mixed strategy produced by Brown's algorithm converges to the optimal mixed strategy for either player. Furthermore, in each iteration we obtain a lower bound and an upper bound for the value of the game. The upper bound is produced by Red's best trigger against a feasible Blue's mixed strategy in step 3, because Blue can guarantee such expected damage with the chosen mixed strategy. Similarly, the lower
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bound is produced by Blue's best loadset against Red's mixed strategy.
NUMERICAL DEMONSTRATIONS
This section presents numerical examples to demonstrate our game-theoretic models and their applications. The main example is summarized in Table 3 , where Red chooses from 10 triggers, which together use 14 frequency bands. These mockup data are derived from open sources to replicate a plausible, real-world scenario. In this example, we set the damage of each trigger to 1, so that we can better interpret the result as the probability of an RCIED attack. Below we use this example to demonstrate our models and their applications.
Effectiveness of Active Jamming
First, consider the case of active jamming. As seen in Table 3 , trigger 9 requires 3 3 4 5 12 watts to jam, which is the most among all triggers. If the total jamming power is less than 12 watts, then Red can use trigger 9 to guarantee a successful attack. On the other hand, if the total jammer power is 30 watts or more, then the jammer can jam all triggers at once. Consequently, we are interested in the case when the jamming power is between 12 and 30 watts. Figure 1 shows the value of the game (probability of an RCIED attack) as the function of jamming power, which is solved by linear programming as discussed earlier. The probability of attack decreases as a step function, as the jamming power increases. The biggest gain occurs when the jamming power reaches 12 watts, as the probability of RCIED attack drops from 1 to 2/3. The rate of improvement stays flat in some areas (such as around 18, 22, and 26 watts), and increases rapidly in others (such as around 16, 20, 24, and 29 watts).
If Blue has several different types of jammers-some with more jamming power than the others-and operates in several areas with different trigger availability, then Figure 1 can help Blue decide how to allocate the different jammers among these areas. From the standpoint of research and design, Blue can use Figure 1 to determine whether it is worthwhile to invest in technology to increase the jamming power. For instance, increasing the jamming power from 17 watts to 19 watts does not reduce the probability of attack at all.
Risk of Using Past to Predict Future
In a two-person zero-sum game, if Blue observes Red's action over time and predicts what Red will do based on these observations, then Blue's optimal strategy would be a pure strategy. With this approach, however, not only will Blue be overly optimistic in predicting the outcome, but Blue's performance can also be suboptimal and his action predicable. This section demonstrates such a risk in IED warfare with the active jamming model. Consider the example in Table 3 , and suppose our jammer has 18 watts. After removing infeasible and dominated loadsets, there remain 32 loadsets. Consider a scenario in which Red uses the optimal mixed strategy, while Blue observes 20 RCIED attacks and counts the number of times each trigger is used. Blue then finds the best loadset against the mixture of these 20 triggers. What will happen if Blue uses the past attack data to predict what Red will do in the future? Table 4 shows the perceived probability of RCIED attack when Red uses the optimal mixed strategy, while Blue determines the best loadset based on recent attack data. For each jamming power level, we vary the number of data points from past attack from 20 to 80, and use Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the probability of a successful RCIED attack. For each case, we conduct enough simulation runs so that the standard error is less than 1 percent of the estimate. In the last row, we also report the value of the game, which is also the case when the number of data points tends to infinity, because Blue can observe precisely what Red's optimal mixed strategy is in that case.
As shown in Table 4 , Blue tends to be overly optimistic. Even when there are 80 data points, the perceived attack probability still ranges between 77 and 85 percent of the value of the game. Blue is falsely informed, as the actual danger of RCIED attack is higher than Blue expects.
When choosing the best loadset based on past attack data, it is possible to achieve the value of the game, if the chosen loadset happens to be active in Blue's optimal mixed strategy, and if Red continues to use the same mixed strategy. The real risk of using past to predict Table 4 . The probability of a successful RCIED attack perceived by Blue, when Red uses the optimal mixed strategy, while Blue determines the best loadset based on past attack data. The numbers in the parentheses are the percentage compared with the value of the game. Figure 1 . The value of the game (probability of a successful attack) with active jamming as a function of the jamming power for the example in Table 3 .
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future, however, is to falsely assume Red is an inactive player, who continues to do what he has been doing. If Blue uses the procedure discussed in this section to deploy his jammer loadset, then Red can also collect the past attack data, compute the ''best'' loadset Blue will use, and then use a trigger that is not covered by that loadset. The consequence is the attack probability of 1.
Effect of Background Radio Traffic on Reactive Jamming
With reactive jamming, the jammer first scans the entire frequency spectrum before deciding which loadset to use. One can expect the performance of reactive jamming to depend a lot on the radio environment in the operational theater. For instance, in a desert where there is little background radio traffic (radio signals due to legitimate use of wireless devices), the jammer can almost always find a loadset to block all possible triggers after first detecting radio signals. On the other hand, in an urban area where people use a variety of wireless devices all the time, there may not be much difference between active jamming and reactive jamming.
In our experiments, we assume the probability that each band has background radio traffic is the same, so that we can better interpret the results; that is, a j 5 a, for all j 2 B. When a 5 1, the reactive jammer detects radio signals in all the frequency bands, so listening does not provide any additional information. Consequently, the case a 5 1 with reactive jamming coincides with the case of active jamming. The smaller the value of a, the less the background traffic, and the more likely the reactive jammer can block all possible triggers after first scanning the frequency spectrum. Consequently, the probability of a successful RCIED attack increases as a increases.
We use the same example in Table 3 , and consider three power levels: 18, 22, and 26 watts. Figure 2 shows the performance of reactive jamming as a function of a, which ranges from 0.4 to 1. For each scenario, we use the algorithm for computing the optimal mixed strategy with 100,000 iterations to estimate the value of the game (probability of attack). The difference between the upper bound and the lower bound, in each scenario, is less than 1 percent of the value of the game. The probability of attack is plotted as a percentage to that of active jamming. In other words, the plot shows the improvement of reactive jamming over active jamming.
As seen in Figure 2 , the performance of reactive jamming is very sensitive to a, as the probability of attack drops significantly when a decreases from 1. Also seen in Figure 2 , the more the jamming power, the more the improvement of reactive jamming over active jamming. If Blue has several types of jammers-with both active Figure 2 . Performance of reactive jamming as a function of the probability of background radio traffic in each band for the problem in Table 3 .
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